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KEYWORDS: Asymmetric information, Dynamic mechanism design, Long-term contracts,
Term life insurance, Sequential screening.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C73, D82, D86.
†UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, R.BOLESLAVSKY@MIAMI.EDU
‡OLIN BUSINESS SCHOOL, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS, SAID@WUSTL.EDU
We thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Rahul Deb, Tracy Lewis, Pino Lopomo, Leslie
Marx, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Mallesh Pai, Larry Samuelson, Curt Taylor, and Huseyin Yildirim for their many helpful
comments and suggestions. This work beneﬁted greatly from the comments of two anonymous referees and the editor,
Bruno Biais, and seminar participants at several institutions. The second author also thanks Microsoft Research New
England for its generous hospitality during stays in which a signiﬁcant portion of this work was completed.PROGRESSIVE SCREENING
1. INTRODUCTION
Long-term contracts are a salient feature of a wide variety of economic situations. In many
of these settings, the fundamental features of the contractual relationship are not static; rather,
these features may change over time. Moreover, while the dynamic nature of the relationship may
be acknowledged by all parties involved, the precise nature of the changes may be the private
information of only one of the parties; for instance, a seller need not be aware of how her buy-
ers’ preferences have evolved, and a downstream retailer need not know the effectiveness of an
upstream manufacturer’s investments in cost reduction. Thus, the manner in which a contract
accounts for these dynamic information asymmetries is crucial, and several recent papers (see,
among others, Courty and Li (2000), Battaglini (2005), Pavan (2007), and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka
(2009)) have explored this question in a variety of settings.
In the present work, we explore the impact of an additional source of private information on
the structure and properties of optimal long-term contracts. In particular, we are interested in
studying settings in which one party is privately informed not only about the current state of the
contracting environment, but also about the manner in which this state evolves. We analyze this
issue in the standard setting of the literature, that of an ongoing trading relationship between a
monopolist seller and a single consumer. In this relationship, the seller has all of the bargaining
power and can credibly commit to the terms of trade for the entire interaction at the outset, while
the buyer is privately informed about both her preferences in each period and a parameter of the
stochastic process which governs the evolution of her value.
Formally, we characterize the proﬁt-maximizing T-period contract (where T is potentially inﬁ-
nite) for a single seller facing a buyer with single-unit demand whose value evolves according to
a stochastic process with a privately known transition probability. We assume that in the initial
period, the buyer privately observes the value of a parameter l 2 [0,1]. In subsequent periods,
the buyer privately observes a random shock, and her value in each of these periods is the prod-
uct of all previously observed shocks. Each shock can take one of two values: it can be either a
“good” shock u with probability l, or a “bad” shock d < u with probability 1   l. The values u
and d are both common knowledge, but the realization of each shock is known only to the buyer.
Thus, a buyer with a high value of l is more likely to experience the good shock in each period,
and the distribution of her value at any point in time ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the value
distribution of a buyer with a lower realization of l.
At the beginning of the interaction, the seller’s goal is to design a long-term contract to max-
imize her expected proﬁt. We assume that the seller has the ability to fully commit to arbitrary
contractual forms, and so the revelation principle allows us to restrict attention, without loss of
generality, to the class of direct revelation mechanisms in which the buyer is incentivized to report
her private information truthfully.1 These incentives are required to hold both at the time of initial
contracting and in every future period thereafter. Moreover, we assume that the buyer is free to
terminate the relationship at any point in time, implying that the buyer’s continued participation
must be incentivized as well. Thus, the seller’s problem in its most general form is to design a
1This is in contrast to, for instance, Kennan (2001) and Loginova and Taylor (2008), where the seller’s lack of commit-
ment power restricts her to offering only one-period spot contracts.
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direct revelation mechanism that maximizes the expected discounted sum of payments made by
the buyer, subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints in each period.2
The main result of this paper is that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a long-term
contract with an especially simple structure. In the case where the good is produced in each period
at zero cost, the seller (optimally) commits to a ﬁnite menu of price plans, each of which presents
the buyer with an entry fee and a predetermined sequence of prices for the good in each period.3
On the basis of l, the buyer selects a plan and then is free, in each period, to exercise an option
to purchase the good at the price speciﬁed for that period by her chosen plan.4 Because prices
are ﬁxed by the seller at the beginning of the interaction, this mechanism can be implemented
without eliciting any further information from the buyer over the lifetime of the contract—the
only information that the seller needs the buyer to reveal is her choice of price plan.
Moreover, each of these price plans begins with a ﬁnite “honeymoon” phase. In each period
of this phase, the price for the good is the lowest possible value that any buyer could have; af-
ter the honeymoon phase ends, the price of the good is multiplied by a factor u in each period.
Thus, the buyer is incentivized to purchase the good in each period of the honeymoon phase,
regardless of the realizations of her value shocks. After this phase, however, the price rises de-
terministically, while the buyer’s value grows only stochastically—with a sufﬁciently long time
horizon, this serves to (inefﬁciently) terminate the relationship. As the prices in a plan with a
longer honeymoon phase are always (weakly) lower than the prices in a plan with a shorter hon-
eymoon phase, such a plan is more attractive to all buyers, regardless of the probabilities of good
and bad shocks. However, the entry fees for the various plans are increasing in the length of their
honeymoon phases. So in order to justify paying a larger initial fee, the buyer must anticipate that
her future values will be (with high probability) sufﬁciently high that the lower future prices fully
compensate for the initial fee—paying a larger entry fee is justiﬁed only if the buyer’s probability
of good shocks l is sufﬁciently high. Thus, the various entry fees and honeymoon phase lengths
serve to screen across realizations of l, while the post-honeymoon-phase rise in prices serves to
restrict supply to lower-valued buyers, reducing the rents paid to higher-valued buyers.
Asanexampleofareal-worldsettingwithaninformationstructureofthetypedescribedabove,
consider the market for life insurance. Under the terms of a typical life insurance contract, the in-
suranceprovideragreestopaythebuyer’sbeneﬁciaries(usuallyherdependents)apredetermined
sum in the case of the policyholder’s death, while individuals purchase this insurance in order to
provide for their dependents after their passing. Obviously, the probability of death at any point
in time is a critical factor in determining the value of life insurance to the individual. Because the
individual is privately informed about her physical and mental health, family history, lifestyle,
stress levels, and so on, her valuation for a life insurance policy is private. However, she may also
have private information about how this value is likely to evolve in the future: for example, she
may anticipate receiving a series of promotions (with some probability), each of which will lead to
more responsibility, more stress, a more sedentary lifestyle, and more travel, all of which increase
2Maximizing social welfare in this setting is trivial, as the buyer’s initial-period private information is irrelevant to
payoffs post-contracting when the buyer learns her valuations.
3These qualititative features of the optimal contract carry over to the case of positive marginal cost; see Section 4.
4Thus, the buyer chooses among a set of priority pricing schemes à la Harris and Raviv (1981) or Wilson (1993).
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the probability of death (and hence the value for life insurance). Thus, a potential buyer of life
insurance will have private information about both her value for an insurance policy as well as
the manner in which this value evolves over time.
Translating these features into our model, we interpret u > 1 as a negative health shock which
increases the buyer’s value for life insurance. In the absence of such a shock, the buyer’s life
insuranceremainsconstant(andso d = 1). Wemaytheninterpret l astheprobabilityofanegative
health shock in each period. Buyers with higher values of l are more pessimistic about their future
health, and consequently expect higher future values for life insurance.
In this setting, our model predicts that the seller optimally offers the buyer her choice from a
set of contracts differentiated by their temporal price proﬁle. In particular, each contract offers a
constantpriceduringahoneymoonphaseofpredeterminedlength, followedbyasteepincreasein
prices in each period thereafter. This is, in fact, precisely the nature of the contracts we observe in
the term life insurance market. Insurance companies typically offer a set of contracts differentiated
by length of term, where longer-term contracts have a longer and ﬂatter time proﬁle of premiums
over the duration of the term, followed by a steep rise in premiums. Thus, real-world term life
insurance contracts match the qualitative features of the optimal contracts predicted by our model.
(We elaborate further on this point in Section 4.2.)
We also extend our analysis to the setting in which the seller faces an increasing and convex
cost function, while dropping the single-unit demand assumption. Meanwhile, the buyer’s val-
uation shocks are independently drawn from a family of continuous distributions parameterized
by l. We assume that this family is ordered by ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, so that larger
realizations of l generate, in expectation, higher valuations. As before, the search for an optimal
long-term contract can be restricted to the class of incentive compatible and individually rational
direct mechanisms.
While the optimal contract in this more general environment is (as is expected) not quite as
simple as that in the single-unit demand case described above, it continues to follow a relatively
straightforward form. In the initial period, the buyer is offered her choice from a continuum of
contingent price-quantity schedules. For each possible initial-period report of l, the buyer faces
a ﬁxed sequence of menus of price-quantity pairs that screen across her sequence of shocks. As
is standard in the nonlinear pricing literature, each of these menus provides greater quantities
of the good to buyers that report higher shocks. Moreover, these menus feature more generous
quantity provision for buyers with higher reported values of l, increasing the quantities allocated
to buyers that receive a positive amount of the good and excluding a smaller range of realized
valuations. However, within a particular sequence of menus, the quantity schedule in a given
period is less permissive than the preceding period’s menu. The seller progressively screens the
buyer and “tightens the screws”: the set of period-(t + 1) reports that lead to positive quanti-
ties is a subset of the corresponding set of period-t reports. Thus, as in the optimal contract for
the single-unit demand case, the seller inefﬁciently restricts supply in order to extract additional
rents, and these restrictions are greater for buyers that report lower values of l. Meanwhile, the
prices corresponding to this optimal long-term contract are similar to those in the discrete model:
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within each period’s price-quantity menu, the prices are determined entirely by the standard in-
tegral payment rule that guarantees incentive compatibility in static settings, depending only on
the allocation rule for the period in question. Finally, the entry fees for more permissive menus are
higher than those of less permissive menus. Again, in order to justify paying a greater initial entry
fee, a buyer must anticipate higher future values—the seller screens across the initial private infor-
mation by using entry fees and more or less generous sequences of menus, and then progressively
screens across values with nonlinear prices in future periods.
As is typically the case in dynamic mechanism design, the primary hurdle we face in solving
for the seller’s optimal long-term contract is the nature of the incentive compatibility constraints
when private information is multidimensional. In particular, incentive compatibility requires that
the buyer prefers the truthful reporting of her private information to all potential misreports,
including compound multi-stage deviations from truthfulness. This generates a complex and rel-
atively intractable set of constraints that must be satisﬁed by any optimal contract. The predomi-
nant approach in the literature for dealing with this issue is to impose a Markov structure on the
evolution of types, which (when combined with a “strong monotonicity” property of the alloca-
tion rule) implies that the buyer’s optimal strategy following a misreport is to make an additional
“corrective” misreport.5 In our model, however, the buyer’s “type” in each period consists of both
her initial-period private information l and her valuation. Since l has a persistent impact on the
distribution of future values, it is impossible to fully “correct” an initial-period misreport by using
additional misreports. Thus, the standard approach is not applicable in the present setting.
We therefore employ an indirect approach to solving for the seller’s optimal long-term contract:
we solve a relaxed problem that imposes only a restricted set of constraints that are necessarily
satisﬁed by any incentive compatible mechanism, and then show that (in our setting) this re-
stricted set of constraints is, in fact, sufﬁcient for “full” incentive compatibility. More speciﬁcally,
we impose a set of single-deviation constraints that rule out “one-shot” deviations from truthful
reporting. We show that, in the discrete shock setting, the allocation rule that follows from this
restricted set of constraints depends only on the buyer’s realized value in any period, and not
on the particular sequence of shocks generating that value. By pairing this allocation rule with a
payment scheme that is also path independent, we are able to decouple the buyers incentives in
any one period from those in the next. This guarantees that truthfulness is an optimal continu-
ation strategy for a buyer, regardless of her history of past reports or misreports. This property
implies that the restricted class of constraints in our relaxed problem are, in fact, sufﬁcient for
“global” incentive compatibility. In the more general setting with continuously distributed valu-
ation shocks, however, the solution to the relaxed version of the seller’s problem need not have
this property. We therefore present a sufﬁcient condition on the conditional distribution of shocks
that guarantees the path-independence of the allocation rule, thereby justifying our approach.
5This is the approach of, for instance, Battaglini (2005), Pavan (2007), and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009). Courty and
Li (2000) do not require a Markov assumption since they consider only a two-period model, while Kakade, Lobel, and
Nazerzadeh (2011) directly assume incentive compatibility after initial-period misreports.
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Our paper contributes to the recent, and growing, literature on optimal dynamic mechanism de-
sign. This literature focuses on the design of proﬁt-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic settings.6
Much of this recent work focuses on settings where agents arrive and depart dynamically over
time while their private information remains ﬁxed, including, for example, the work of Board and
Skrzypacz (2010); Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009a); Pai and Vohra (2011); Said (2011); and Vul-
cano, van Ryzin, and Maglaras (2002). In contrast, our paper joins another strand of the literature
where the population of agents is ﬁxed, but their private information changes over time—see, for
instance, Baron and Besanko (1984); Battaglini (2005); Besanko (1985); Courty and Li (2000); Deb
(2009, 2011); Esö and Szentes (2007); Krähmer and Strausz (2011); and Pavan (2007). The recent
work of Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009, 2010) presents a broad and general framework subsuming
much of the pre-existing literature on dynamic contracting and screening as special cases. Among
their many contributions, they provide general necessary conditions for incentive compatibility
and optimality in dynamic environments, as well as sufﬁcient conditions in some environments.7
In contrast to their work, which develops a quite general toolkit for dynamic mechanism design,
our present focus is narrower and signiﬁcantly more applied. In particular, we are concerned
with the structure of optimal contracts in a particular setting—one in which the buyer is initially
privately informed about the process by which her value evolves. Therefore, our work extends
the existing dynamic mechanism design literature by considering a novel information structure
within a multi-period time horizon, allowing us to examine the dynamics of revenue-enhancing
distortions in a new setting.
The most closely related work to our own is the sequential screening model of Courty and Li
(2000), who study dynamic price discrimination when consumers are initially uncertain about
their future demand but receive new private information before consumption; however, we ex-
tend their model in important ways.8 First, we extend their two-period model to an arbitrary (and
potentially inﬁnite) time horizon. This allows us to explore the long-term characteristics of opti-
mal contracts; for instance, the progressive screening, “screw-tightening,” and (inefﬁcient) early
termination of the relationship by the seller are features of the optimal contract that cannot be in-
tuited from a two-period model. In addition, the longer time horizon necessitates consideration of
a richer set of incentive compatibility constraints, as the buyer may choose to misreport her value
multiple times in an attempt to take advantage of future contractual terms. This introduces ad-
ditional technical difﬁculties in identifying the optimal contract, and we provide a new approach
to circumventing such issues. Moreover, since multiple allocations are made over time, we ﬁnd
it more compelling to consider contracts where the buyer pays a price for consumption in each
period instead of refund contracts where the buyer pays only an upfront fee and then receives
6There is also a parallel literature focusing on the design of efﬁcient mechanisms for dynamic settings; see, among
others, Athey and Segal (2007a,b); Bergemann and Välimäki (2010); Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009b, 2010a,b); and
Kuribko and Lewis (2010). The curious reader is directed to Bergemann and Said (2011), who survey both literatures.
7This is complemented by the recent work of Kakade, Lobel, and Nazerzadeh (2011), who provide sufﬁcient conditions
for optimality in a particular class of “separable” environments.
8Dai, Lewis, and Lopomo (2006) examine similar issues in a procurement setting, while Esö and Szentes (2007) extend
the work of Courty and Li (2000) in a different direction and examine a two-period setting in which the seller is able to
control the release of new information to multiple buyers. Meanwhile, Miravete (2003) demonstrates empirically the
importance of sequential screening considerations in the design of contracts for telephone service.
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a refund in the next period. Finally, we extend our results to a setting with inﬁnitely divisible
goods and convex costs of production in addition to the standard setting of single-unit demand
and constant marginal cost.
This latter feature of our analysis is shared with Battaglini (2005), who also studies long-term
contracts when the buyer’s type evolves over time. Unlike the present work, his paper considers
a setting where the stochastic process governing the buyer’s values (a two-state Markov process)
is commonly known, but the current state of the process is privately observed by the buyer alone.
The optimal contract in that setting converges to the efﬁcient level of supply, sharply contrasting
with the inefﬁciently early termination we ﬁnd in our setting. This difference stems from the
multiplicative structure of the buyer’s preferences in our model and the absence of a “highest”
value—regardless of the past history of shocks, the buyer’s value may increase further, and so the
seller continues to distort allocations in order to extract surplus from these higher types. Thus,
the cumulative effect of the buyer’s new information leads to further restriction of supply over
time instead of eventual efﬁciency. We should point out that this payoff structure also provides a
counterpoint to the additive preferences of Krähmer and Strausz (2011), as well as the examples
with autoregressive values presented by Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009, 2010).
2. ENVIRONMENT
We consider a dynamic setting in which a buyer repeatedly purchases a nondurable good from
a single seller. When the buyer in period t pays a price p and receives quantity q of the good, her
utility is vtq   p. The buyer’s value for the good vt evolves over time; in particular, we assume
that the buyer’s value is subject to a series of multiplicative shocks, so that
vt = atvt 1,
where we take v0 = 1 to be exogenously given and commonly known.
In each period t = 1,...,T, the buyer privately observes the shocks to her valuation, which are
the realizations fatg of a sequence of independently and identically distributed random variables
f˜ atg. In particular, we assume that each shock at is drawn from A := fu,dg, where
Pr(˜ at = u) = l and Pr(˜ at = d) = 1  l.
We assume that u > d > 0, and let D := u   d. Thus, the buyer’s value evolves according to
a recombinant binomial tree process with upward transition probability l.9 In each period, the
buyer’s value experiences either a “good” shock (u) or a “bad” shock (d), and the probability l of
the buyer experiencing the higher shock u in each period is ﬁxed across time.
At the time of contracting (which we take to be period zero), the buyer is privately informed
about this transition probability l. Speciﬁcally, the buyer privately observes the realization l of a
random variable ˜ l, where it is commonly known that ˜ l is distributed according to the distribution
function F on the interval L := [0,1]. We denote by f the density of F, and assume throughout
that f is strictly positive and differentiable on L.
9Recombinant binomial tree processes have been frequently used in ﬁnance to model asset prices since their introduc-
tion by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979).
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In each period t  1, the seller can produce q units of the good at a cost c(q).10 We assume that
the relationship between the buyer and the seller is repeated for T  ¥ periods and discounted
with the common discount factor d 2 (0,1] (with the additional restriction that du < 1 if T = ¥).
In the initial period (period 0), the seller offers a long-term supply contract to the buyer; the buyer
can either accept or reject this offer. If the buyer accepts, sales and consumption occur in periods
t = 1,...,T in accordance with the terms of the contract. We normalize the buyer’s outside option
to 0. As is standard in dynamic models of price discrimination, we assume that the monopolist
fully commits to the contract that is offered. However, we will assume that commitment is one-
sided: the buyer is free to break off the relationship at any time.
3. THE SELLER’S PROBLEM
The seller in this setting wishes to design and offer the contract that maximizes her expected
proﬁts. It is easy to show that in our environment, the Myerson (1986) revelation principle for
multistage games holds. Therefore, the search for optimal contracts may be restricted without
loss of generality to the class of direct mechanisms where, in each period, the agent is asked to
report her new information and, conditional on having reported truthfully in the past, she ﬁnds it
optimal to report truthfully.
3.1. Direct Mechanisms
In particular, a contract in our setting is a sequence of payment rules p = fpt(rt,ht)gT
t=0 and
allocation probabilities q = fqt(rt,ht)gT
t=1, where rt is the buyer’s report at time t, and ht is the
public history at time t. Note that in such a direct mechanism, r0 2 L, while rt 2 A for all t  1. In
addition, ht can be deﬁned recursively by h0 := Æ and ht := frt 1,ht 1g for all t  1, where rt 1 is
the agents report in period t 1. We denote the set of time t public histories by Ht. Since the agent
is free to misreport her private information at any time, her private history is ˆ ht := fat,rt 1, ˆ ht 1g,
where ˆ h0 := flg. We denote the set of time t private histories by ˆ Ht; the buyer’s strategy, given the
seller’s mechanism, is then simply a sequence of mappings ˆ rt : ˆ Ht ! A for t  1, and ˆ r0 : L ! L.
In addition, we will ﬁnd it convenient to denote histories using a particular notation. We will
denote by at the sequence of shocks received by the buyer up to, and including, time t; that is,
at := (at,at 1,...,a1).
In addition, the notation at
 s will denote the sequence of shocks up to (and including) period t,
but after period s, so that
at
 s := (at,at 1 ...,as+1).
Finally, we will abuse notation somewhat to simplify the exposition and write v(at) to denote the






10In Section 4, we will examine the case of single-unit demand for a good produced at a constant marginal cost (c(q) =
cq), as well as the case of an inﬁnitely divisible good with an increasing and convex cost function (c(q) = q2/2).
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A direct mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if it induces truthtelling in every period;
that is, on the equilibrium path, the agent has no incentive to misreport her new private informa-
tion. In particular, this implies that the agent prefers revealing her private information truthfully
to any potential misreport, followed by optimal reporting in the future (where optimal continua-
tion reporting may involve future misreports). This implies that the set of incentive compatibility
constraints in our setting is large and potentially quite complex, and therefore intractable.
In order to avoid this problem, we use an indirect approach to solving for the seller’s optimal
mechanism. In particular, we consider a restricted set of constraints that are necessarily satisﬁed
by any incentive compatible mechanism, and then show that (in our setting) this restricted set of
constraints is, in fact, sufﬁcient for “full” incentive compatibility. More speciﬁcally, we require that
the buyer prefers reporting her private information truthfully to misreporting in any given period
and then reporting truthfully in every future period; that is, we rule out single-period deviations
from truthful reporting. The optimal allocation rule that follows from this restricted set of con-
straintshasa“pathindependence”property(thatwillbemadeclearinsubsequentsections)thatis
inherited from the stochastic process governing values. Since there is an additional degree of free-
dom in choosing payment rules in dynamic mechanisms (relative to their static counterparts), this
allocation rule can be paired with a path independent payment rule that guarantees truthtelling
as an optimal continuation strategy for a buyer who has misreported in the past, thereby implying
the sufﬁciency of the restricted set of constraints for “global” incentive compatibility.
To state the initial (period 0) single-deviation constraint, let U0(l) denote the utility of a buyer
with initial type l who always reports her private information truthfully; thus, for all l 2 L,











Similarly, let ˆ U0(l0,l) denote the expected utility of a buyer with initial type l who reports some
l0, but then truthfully reports all future shocks; for all l,l0 2 L, we have











Thus, the initial period single-deviation constraint requires that
U0(l)  ˆ U0(l0,l) for all l,l0 2 L. (IC-0)
As with U0(l), denote by Ut(at,l) the expected utility of a buyer in period t whose initial type
was l and whose observed shocks were at 2 At, and who has reported truthfully in the past and
continues to do so in the present and future. Then
















Preventing a single deviation in period t requires, for all (at,l) 2 At  L and all a0





















In addition, we will say that a direct mechanism is individually rational if, in every period and for
every history of private signals, it guarantees the buyer’s (continued) willingness to participate
in the contract by providing expected utility greater than her outside option. These individual
rationality constraints may be summarized by the following:
U0(l)  0 for all l 2 L, and (IR-0)
Ut(at,l)  0 for all (at,l) 2 At  L and all t = 1,...,T. (IR-t)
The seller’s proﬁt from any feasible contract is the difference between total surplus and the
buyer’s utility. Thus, when the buyer is of initial type l, the seller’s expected proﬁt is



















The seller’s optimal contract maximizes proﬁts, subject to the constraints that the consumer re-
ceives at least her reservation utility and that the consumer has no incentive to misreport her type.
Thus, any optimal contract must also solve the relaxed problem that imposes the individual ratio-







subject to (IC-0), (IR-0), (IC-t), and (IR-t) for all t = 1,...,T.
(P)
3.2. Simplifying the Seller’s Relaxed Problem
We approach the seller’s optimal contracting problem by simplifying the single-deviation and
participation constraints in the relaxed problem (P). Recall that in a standard static contracting
setting, the combination of quasilinearity and a single-crossing condition imply that incentive
constraints are equivalent to (i) the monotonicity of the allocation rule; and (ii) the determination
of a buyer’s utility (up to a constant) by that allocation rule alone. In addition, the single-crossing
property and individual rationality constraint pin down this constant. We begin by showing that a
similar technique may be applied in our setting to the period-t constraints. Note, however, that the
buyer is forward looking, and her utility depends upon her expectations (given her information in
period t) over future shocks. Naturally, this implies that the “localized” period-t constraints will
involve the expected discounted value of current and future allocations, which we denote by














Thus, we have the following “standard” result (whose proof may be found in appendix):
LEMMA 3.1. The period-t incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints (IC-t) and (IR-t),
where t = 1,...,T, are satisﬁed if, and only if, for all at 1 2 At 1 and all l 2 L,
Ut(u,at 1,l)   Ut(d,at 1,l)  ¯ qt(d,at 1,l)D; (IC0-t)
¯ qt(u,at 1,l)  ¯ qt(d,at 1,l); and (MON-t)
Ut(d,at 1,l)  0. (IR0-t)
Notice that at the time of initial contracting (in contrast to any period t  1), the buyer’s pri-
vate information does not directly affect her payoffs. Rather, the realization of l only provides the
buyer a (noisy) signal about the evolution of her future preferences. Therefore, the buyer has pref-
erences over the entire sequence of allocations, and so we cannot appeal to a single-crossing condi-
tion to simplify the initial-period constraints. However, using an envelope argument (detailed in
the appendix), we can show that period-zero single-deviation constraint necessarily implies that
the buyer’s interim (in the initial period) expected utility depends only upon the the expectation
of future payoff gradients; in particular, this observation—in conjunction with the period-t single-
deviation constraints (IC0-t)—will then allow us to reformulate the seller’s relaxed problem (P)
into one involving only allocation rules (and not the payment rules).
LEMMA 3.2. If the period-zero incentive compatibility constraint (IC-0) is satisﬁed, then the derivative
U0













Note that since allocation probabilities are non-negative, if condition (IC0-t) is satisﬁed, U0
0(l)
is also non-negative. Therefore, U0 must be increasing in any solution to the seller’s problem, and
we can replace the period-zero individual rationality constraint (IR-0) with the requirement that
U0(0)  0. (IR0-0)
We should point out that (IC0-0) is a necessary implication of period-zero incentive compatibil-
ity, but that it is not sufﬁcient. Although this expression allows us to simplify the optimization
problem by eliminating transfers from the seller’s objective function, those transfers remain a part
of the problem’s constraints.
Finally, we may return to the seller’s problem. Since (IC0-0) must hold in any incentive compat-
ible mechanism, we may use the standard integration by parts methodology to reformulate the
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subject to (IC-0), (IC0-t), (MON-t), (IR0-0), and (IR0-t) for all t = 1,...,T.
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Clearly, any solution to this problem must have U0(0) = 0, as this is merely an additive con-
stant that is bounded by the constraint (IR0-0)—as is standard, providing additional surplus to
the lowest type only reduces the seller’s proﬁt without helping provide incentives for truthtelling.
In addition, it is clear that solving the problem requires minimizing Ut(u,at 1,l)   Ut(d,at 1,l)
for each at 1 2 At 1 and l 2 L. However, the constraints (IC0-t) provide a lower bound on this
difference, and so these constraints must bind. In particular, this implies that we may incorporate

















































































where the ﬁnal equality follows from interchanging the order of summations. Substituting this ex-





































subject to (IC-0), (MON-t), and (IR0-t) for all t = 1,...,T.
(P0)
3.3. Virtual Values
Before proceeding to the solution of the seller’s problem, it is helpful to interpret the seller’s
objective function in (P0), especially by way of comparison with a standard nonlinear pricing
setting (as in, for instance, Mussa and Rosen (1978)). For each t and every l 2 L, we can rewrite






































where 1d(as) is the indicator function for the event fas = dg. Thus, the seller is essentially maxi-























As in the static mechanism design setting, the ﬁrst term in this expression is the buyer’s con-
tribution to the social surplus, while the second term represents the information rents that must
be “paid” to the buyer in order to induce truthful revelation of her private information. The in-
verse hazard rate (1  F(l))/f(l) appears since any information rents paid to a buyer with initial
type l must also be paid to buyers with higher initial types. Finally, as is well-established in
the dynamic mechanism design literature, distortions in the optimal contract are determined by
the sensitivity of future values to the buyer’s initial private information. In our setting, the re-




1 l; more speciﬁcally, this expression is equal to the derivative ¶vt/¶l
of the period-t value vt with respect to l. Since our environment is a hybrid of continuous and
discrete type spaces, this property is most easily demonstrated by using the “independent shock
approach” introduced in Esö and Szentes (2007) and further developed in Pavan (2007).
With this in mind, deﬁne fxtgT
t=1 to be a sequence of independent (across t and, crucially, also





d˜ vt 1(xt 1,l) if xt < 1  l,
u˜ vt 1(xt 1,l) if xt  1  l,
where xs denotes the s-tuple (xs,xs 1,...,x1) and we deﬁne ˜ v0(l) := 1 for all l. Thus, we can
identify all xt < 1   l with the shock at = d, and similarly, we can identify all xt  1   l with
the shock at = u. This implies that we may identify a buyer with private type (at,l) with the
“average buyer” whose private type is (xt,l) with xt corresponding to at for all t = 1,...,t.
Since we can write
˜ vt(xt,l) = (d + DH1 l(xt)) ˜ vt 1(xt 1,l),
where Hz() is the Heaviside step function shifted by z 2 R, it is straightforward to see that
¶˜ vt(xt,l)
¶l

































































xs < 1  l if as = d,
xs  1  l if as = u.
#
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Note that the fact that each shock enters the buyer’s value multiplicatively implies that the addi-
tional distortions generated by the dependence of at on l have the additive structure above. This
is in contrast to, for example, the nature of distortions in Besanko (1985), the Markovian setting of
Battaglini (2005), the autoregressive values examples presented by Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009,
2010), and the procurement model of Krähmer and Strausz (2011).
Before moving on, we make the following additional assumption:
ASSUMPTION A. The distribution of initial-period values F is such that
1  F(l)
(1  l)f(l)
is (weakly) decreasing in l.
This regularity assumption is a sufﬁcient condition for the buyer’s virtual value j(at,l) to be
nondecreasing in l for all at 2 At and all t, and will allow us to avoid concerns about ironing
that arise when virtual values are non-monotone. This assumption is satisﬁed by a large vari-
ety of distributions F on [0,1]. For instance, the uniform distribution on [0,1], as well as any
power distribution F(l) = lx, where x  1, satisﬁes this assumption. Similarly, the beta and Ku-
maraswamy distributions satisfy Assumption A whenever their shape parameters are a  1 and
b > 0. We should note that this assumption is strictly stronger than the standard regularity as-
sumption that F is log-concave; however, similar regularity conditions are imposed in essentially
all dynamic mechanism design settings.11
11The utility of such conditions was ﬁrst noted by Baron and Besanko (1984) and Besanko (1985), and an analogous
condition was imposed by Matthews and Moore (1987) in a multi-dimensional screening setting. An equivalent con-
dition on the conditional distribution of future types on initial period private information is found in, for instance, the
sequential screening model of Courty and Li (2000), the information disclosure setting of Esö and Szentes (2007), and
the Krähmer and Strausz (2011) model of pre-project planning in procurement. Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009) also
make additional monotonicity conditions on primitives in order to avoid ironing concerns. A notable exception to this
trend is found in Kakade, Lobel, and Nazerzadeh (2011); however, their model imposes “separability” conditions that
rule out the dependence of buyer values on initial-period private information found in the present work.
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4. THE OPTIMAL LONG-TERM CONTRACT
We now solve for the optimal dynamic mechanism in this setting for two important cases. We
ﬁrst consider the case in which the buyer has single-unit demand and the good is produced at
a constant marginal cost. In this setting, the optimal contract has an especially simple structure:
the seller commits to a menu of deterministic price sequences. We then turn to the case of an
increasing and convex cost function, and relax the single-unit demand assumption. In this case,
the optimal long-term contract has a more sophisticated, but qualitatively similar, structure: the
seller commits to a menu of deterministic sequences of price-quantity schedules. In both cases,
the initial menu screens across the buyer’s initial-period private information, while the sequence
of prices (or schedules) progressively screen across the buyer’s realized valuations.
4.1. Single-Unit Demand and Constant Marginal Cost
Suppose ﬁrst that the seller produces the good in each period at a constant marginal cost, so that
c(q) = cq for some constant c  0. In addition, suppose that the buyer has single-unit demand. In

















subject to (IC-0), (MON-t), and (IR0-t).
Notice that for all t, the seller’s objective function is linear in qt(at,l) for all at 2 At and l 2
L. Therefore (temporarily ignoring the constraints (IC-0), (MON-t), and (IR0-t)), the seller sets
qt(at,l) = 1 if, and only if, j(at,l)  c, and otherwise sets qt(at,l) = 0.
Consider a history (at,l) where å
t












So for all l < 1, D/d
1 l
1 F(l)
f(l) > 0, implying that the left-hand side of this inequality is decreasing in
k. Therefore, for every t = 1,...,T and every initial-period type l, the buyer is allocated an object
as long as she has experienced sufﬁciently few downward shocks d.12 Formally, we deﬁne
kt(l) := max













where we let kt(l) := 0 if the set being maximized over is empty. The cutoff kt(l) is ﬁnite for all
l < 1. To see this, note that as long as F has a derivative of any order that is non-zero when l = 1,







= g for some constant g > 0; (9)
12Note that, for a buyer with initial-period type l = 1, j(at,l) = v(at) for all at 2 At; thus, such a buyer’s allocation
experiences no distortions away from the efﬁcient allocation. We do not focus on this, however, as this is a zero-
probability type.
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thus, for any t, a buyer who has experienced more than 1/g downward shocks d will have a
negative virtual value. Clearly, our regularity assumption on the distribution F implies that the
cutoff kt(l) is non-decreasing in l for all t.








s=1 1d(as)  kt(l),
0 otherwise.
(10)
Since the term å
t
s=1 1d(as) simply counts the number of realized d shocks in a given history of
signals at, it is trivial to see that q
t(u,at 1,l)  q
t(d,at 1,l) for all at 1 2 At 1 and l 2 L.




 t,d,at 1,l) for all s > t and all as
 t 2
As t and l 2 L. Since this holds for every realization of as
 t, it must also hold when taking
expectations (given l), and therefore condition (MON-t) is satisﬁed. This fact, combined with the
fact that the constraints (IC0-t) bind, implies that the complete set of period-t (for t  1) single-
deviation constraints (IC-t) are satisﬁed.13
Of course, these single-deviation constraints are only a (necessary) subset of the full set of incen-
tive constraints that must be satisﬁed. In particular, the constraints (IC-t) guarantee only that the
buyer prefers reporting her type truthfully in period t  1 to a single deviation from truthfulness;
this property is not, in general, sufﬁcient to guarantee that the buyer does not wish to misreport
her type multiple times over the course of the relationship. However, the allocation rule in Equa-
tion (10) depends only on the number of downward shocks d the buyer has experienced, but not
the order in which they were received—q
t is path independent. This observation suggests that
combining the optimal allocation rule with a path-independent payment rule may lead to “full”
incentive compatibility.
The payment scheme we propose is essentially a sequence of prices determined by the standard
(static) Myersonian payment rule applied to the entire range of possible values in each period, and
not just those that are possible given a particular history of reports. Thus, the “price” of the good









s=1 1d(as)  kt(l),
0 otherwise.
(11)
Having ﬁxed a payment scheme for all future periods, the period-zero “entry fee” is easily pinned












13We will show shortly (see Theorem 1) that the remaining constraints (IC-0) and (IR0-t) in the seller’s relaxed problem





0(m)dm, we can use Lemma 3.2 (combined with the fact that the constraints




























Note that this contract (q,p) guarantees that p
t(at,l)  q
t(at,l)v(at) for all (at,l) 2 At  L,
and so the buyer’s expected ﬂow payoff (when truthful) in each period is always non-negative.
Therefore, the individual rationality constraints (IR0-t) are all satisﬁed.
One natural way to think about the allocation and payment rules above is to consider the cor-
responding indirect mechanism: the seller can implement the contract described above by giving
the buyer a choice among several “plans” differentiated by their initial up-front cost and future
sequence of prices. In each period after the initial choice of plan, the seller does not elicit any
further information from the buyer, but instead simply presents her with a deterministic sequence
of prices. Since the buyer’s behavior after the initial period does not affect future prices, she can
simply make the myopically optimal choice of purchasing the good in period t if the price is lower
than her value.
This elimination of dynamic incentives is precisely the feature of the proposed contract that
guarantees satisfaction of the “full” set of incentive compatibility constraints: the contract induces
truthful reporting by the buyer even after histories in which she previously misreported her pri-
vateinformation(beit l or at forsome t). Thisisbecauseaperiod-t misreport(for t  1)hasoneof
two effects: over-reporting the number of d shocks leads to the exclusion of the buyer in situations
where truthful reporting may have led to a proﬁtable allocation, while under-reporting the num-
ber of d shocks leads to allocations at prices greater than the buyer’s value. As neither of these two
outcomes affects future prices or values, the buyer has no ability to manipulate the mechanism in
future periods, and so there is neither a static nor dynamic incentive for misreporting one’s value.
Thus, it only remains to verify that the proposed solution satisﬁes the initial-period single-
deviation constraint (IC-0). As previously noted, the “localized” version of the constraint derived
in Lemma 3.2 is generally only a necessary, but not sufﬁcient, condition for period-zero incentive
compatibility. However, since it guarantees the monotonicity of the allocation in l, Assumption A
is sufﬁcient for incentive compatibility in the initial period. The theorem below (whose proof is
found in the appendix) demonstrates this fact.
THEOREM 1. Suppose that the distribution F satisﬁes Assumption A. Then the contract (q,p), where
q denotes the quantity schedules from Equation (10) and p denotes the payment rules from Equations (11)
and (12), is an optimal contract that solves the seller’s problem (P0).
So as to fully appreciate the optimal mechanism proposed above, it is helpful to consider the
special case where the good is produced at zero cost in each period. In this case, the condition










Thus, the optimal allocation rule is time independent, and simply sets an upper bound ¯ k(l) on the
number of downward shocks d permitted over the course of the relationship for every period-zero
report l. Moreover, given Assumption A, the optimal contract partitions the set of initial-period
types into a set of intervals Ln := [ln 1,ln) such that ¯ k(l) = n for all l 2 Ln. Each of these
intervals corresponds to a “plan” of future price paths offered by the seller.
Within each plan, the path of prices is straightforward, with the price changing at a predeter-
mined rate in each period—in the plan designated for a buyer with l 2 Ln, the price grows by
a factor d in each of the ﬁrst n periods, and then grows by a factor u in every period thereafter.
(Technically, the price need not actually “grow”: if u < 1 or d < 1, prices will be decreasing.) This
initial period of slower growth in prices is essentially a “honeymoon” phase, after which the slope
of the price path increases. Thus, the set of plans offered by the seller vary by the length of their
honeymoon phases, with longer honeymoon phases demanding higher entry fees in the initial pe-
riod. Indeed, in order to justify paying a larger initial fee, the buyer must anticipate that her future
values will be (with high probability) sufﬁciently high that the lower future prices fully compen-
sate her for the upfront cost—paying a larger initial fee for a future price discount is justiﬁed only
if the buyer’s probability l of experiencing upward shocks u is sufﬁciently high.
Additionally, it is important to note that the length of the honeymoon phase in each plan is
ﬁnite, as is the number of plans offered. (This ﬁniteness follows from the observation in Equa-
tion (9).) Thus, the seller never ﬁnds it optimal to continue serving a buyer after they have ex-
perienced a ﬁxed ﬁnite number of downward shocks, regardless of the number of upward shocks
already experienced. Furthermore, note that ¯ k(l) is independent of the length of the time horizon
T (as well as the discount factor d). This implies that early (inefﬁcient) termination of the contract
will occur with probability arbitrarily close to 1 given a sufﬁciently long time horizon T. Indeed,
the law of large numbers implies that, for all l < 1, the probability of the buyer experiencing more
than ¯ k(l) downward d shocks in the ﬁrst n < T periods approaches 1 as n grows large. Once this
occurs, the buyer will make no additional payments, and will never again receive the good. Thus,
the seller commits to early termination of the relationship so as to increase her revenue.
When the cost of producing the good is strictly positive, then the optimal allocation rule q
t
need not be time independent, nor does the seller necessarily offer a ﬁnite number of plans. In
particular, kt(l)  kt+1(l) when u < 1, and kt(l)  kt+1(l) when u > 1. In this latter case,
a buyer with a virtual value that is positive but less than the marginal cost c will be excluded,
but if her value recovers with sufﬁciently many u shocks, she may be allocated the object again.
However, note that since j(at,l)  0 whenever å
t
s=1 1d(as) > ¯ k(l), we must have kt(l)  ¯ k(l)
for all t, where ¯ k(l) is the upper bound from the costless production case discussed above—once
the buyer’s virtual value becomes negative, it remains negative and the buyer is excluded in all
future periods. Thus, the “price” of the good will eventually grow deterministically at the higher
rate u, while the buyer’s value will only probabilistically grow at that rate—as time proceeds, the
seller progressively screens the buyer by restricting supply when she receives a downward shock
d so as to extract additional rents from the buyer when she receives the higher u shocks. With a
sufﬁciently long time horizon T, this rent extraction leads to the eventual exclusion of all buyers.
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4.2. Term Life Insurance
Recall the life insurance example discussed in the introduction, where a buyer’s value for life
insurance at any point in time varies, as it is inﬂuenced by the probability of death. Moreover,
recall that this probability of death may be inﬂuenced by privately observed factors whose evolu-
tion is also the potential policyholder’s private information. So letting l denote the probability of
a negative health shock in each period, and letting u > 1 =: d, we may interpret our model as one
in which the buyer’s health (and hence value for insurance) remains constant unless she receives
a negative health shock. (Buyers with higher values of l therefore have more pessimistic expecta-
tions about their future health, and are likely to have higher future values for life insurance.)
In such a setting, our model predicts several features of the optimal long-term contract. First,
the optimal contract can be implemented without eliciting information from the buyer over the
lifetime of the relationship. Second, the seller can implement this optimal contract by committing
to a menu of deterministic price plans, each element of which is differentiated by the length of its
honeymoon phase. Moreover, plans with longer honeymoon phases involve a higher upfront fee
but (weakly) lower per-period prices.
Table 1 demonstrates the annualized premiums and cumulative payments, sampled over the
course of 65 years, for each of the Select Term 10 Year, 20 Year, and 30 Year renewable term life in-
surance policies offered by the State Farm Life Insurance Company.14 The initial premium for each
plan is guaranteed for the length of the term (ten, twenty, and thirty years, respectively), during
which no health information is elicited. After this term, the policyholder is free to renew the policy
without providing a statement of health or additional proof of insurability to State Farm; however,
the premiums “increase signiﬁcantly” and “continue to increase annually and are adjustable but
will not exceed the maximum premiums listed in the policy.” As with the term life insurance con-
tracts studied by Hendel and Lizzeri (2003), there is one-sided commitment: the insurer is legally
bound to the terms of the contract while the policyholder may costlessly terminate it at any time.
Select Term 10 Year Select Term 20 Year Select Term 30 Year
Year Premium Cumulative Premium Cumulative Premium Cumulative
5 335 1,675 350 1,750 525 2,625
10 335 3,350 350 3,500 525 5,250
15 3,365 17,385 350 5,250 525 7,875
20 4,850 38,905 350 7,000 525 10,500
30 12,815 124,695 12,815 92,790 525 15,750
35 22,100 214,495 22,100 182,590 22,100 105,550
50 96,440 990,070 96,440 958,165 96,440 881,125
60 264,680 2,763,960 264,680 2,732,055 264,680 2,655,015
65 385,295 4,440,145 385,295 4,408,240 385,295 4,331,200
TABLE 1. State Farm Term Life Insurance Policy Premiums
14Premiums are the “Elite Preferred Non-Tobacco” rates, calculated for $500,000 of coverage for a 30-year-old male in
the state of Missouri. This data can be obtained by visiting http://www.statefarm.com/insurance/quote/lrq.asp.
Similarly structured term life insurance policies are described by, for instance, Hendel and Lizzeri (2003).
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Thus, State Farm (among other insurers) offers buyers a choice of period of time in which pre-
miums remain constant, followed by an increasing premium thereafter. It should be clear that the
premiums during the term of the 20- and 30-year plans may be reduced to the initial premiums of
the 10-year plan without changing the cumulative expenditure by charging an upfront entry fee
equal to the discounted value of the payment difference.15 Moreover, these longer-term policies
cost more (over the course of their term) than the shorter-term 10-year policy. Thus, these term
life insurance policies appears to closely match the optimal long-term contract prescribed by our
model; while we do not want to suggest that State Farm acts as though it were a monopolist, the
natural interpretation is that the insurer is using the different terms to screen across buyers with
differing future health proﬁles, while raising the premiums over time to progressively screen and
ﬁlter out the consumers with the lowest willingness to pay for insurance.
4.3. Convex Costs
The results presented and discussed above are not limited to the unit-demand setting above; a
similar contractual structure arises in a setting in which the seller faces an increasing convex cost
function and we relax the assumption of single-unit demand. To see this, consider the case where
the seller can produce q units of the good in each period at a cost of c(q) = q2/2.16 Then the seller’s





















subject to (IC-0), (MON-t), and (IR0-t).
Pointwise maximization (for each (at,l) tuple) of the integrand while ignoring (for now) the con-



















Notice that this allocation rule distorts the buyer’s quantity away from the ﬁrst-best (efﬁcient)
allocation by a factor that depends on the number of downward shocks d that the buyer reports.
Thus, a report of d in period t affects the buyer’s allocation in two ways: ﬁrst, it leads to a decrease
in her reported value (relative to the value that would have been inferred from a report of u),
thereby decreasing the quantity she would have been allocated in a complete-information setting;
and second, it leads to an increase in the distortion away from the efﬁcient allocation. Moreover,





15The 20-year plan above is equivalent to a 20-year policy with an annual premium of $335 and an upfront fee of
å
20
t=1(350  335)/(1+ r)t, where r is the interest rate. Similarly, the 30-year plan is equivalent to a 30-year policy with
an annual premium of $335 and an upfront fee of å
30
t=1(525  335)/(1+ r)t.
16Assuming a quadratic cost function, as in Battaglini (2005), Pavan (2007), and much of the static contracting literature,
yields signiﬁcant gains in tractability and ease of exposition without signiﬁcant loss of generality.
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 t 2 As t and l 2 L. Since this latter inequality holds for every realization of as
 t, it also
holds in expectation (conditional on l), and therefore the constraint (MON-t) is satisﬁed. Since
the constraints (IC0-t) also bind, this implies that the complete set of period-t (with t  1) single-
deviation incentive constraints are satisﬁed.
Again, we must note that the satisfaction of these constraints need not, in general, guarantee
that the buyer prefers truthful reporting of her type to (potentially complicated) compound de-
viations. However, as was the case in Section 4.1, the allocation rule deﬁned in Equation (13) is,
essentially, a function of l and the buyer’s reported period-t value alone—for each l 2 L and all
t, q
t(at,l) = q
t(ˆ at,l) for any at, ˆ at 2 At such that v(at) = v(ˆ at). Therefore, we make use of a
path-independent payment rule in order to incentivize the buyer to treat her reporting decision in
any period t  1 as a single-period (static) problem.
To this end, we make use of the standard (static) nonlinear pricing rule á la Mussa and Rosen
(1978); however, instead of applying this pricing rule to the set of possible values conditional on
the reported history at 1 (that is, over the set fuv(at 1,dv(at 1)g), we apply it to the entire set of
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)Dut jdj 1. (14)
Note that, with the payments deﬁned above, the buyer’s ﬂow payoff in each period (assuming
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)Dut jdj 1  0.
Therefore, the individual rationality constraints (IR0-t) are satisﬁed for all t  1. Moreover, the
initial-period payment p
0(l) is uniquely determined by combining the deﬁnition of U0(l) in



























Again, it is helpful to interpret the direct mechanism above by considering its indirect counter-







where each period-zero menu choice consists of an entry fee and a predetermined sequence of price-
quantity schedules. Then, in each period t  1, the buyer is free to choose any of the t + 1 price-
quantity pairs on the period-t schedule that correspond to the t + 1 possible values in period t.
Crucially, her choice in any period t  1 does not alter the prices or quantities available to her in
any future periods. This implies that, given any initial-period report of l, the buyer’s decision
problem in each period t  1 is decoupled from her decision problem in any other period t0  1.
Her choice of price-quantity pair then (myopically) maximizes her ﬂow utility in that period.
Notice, however, that since q
t(,l) is decreasing in the reported number of downward d shocks
for all t and all l, it is increasing in the buyer’s value. Standard results from static mechanism
design then imply that the period-t menu is incentive compatible (in the static sense), regard-
less of the buyer’s initial-period report, and so the buyer will choose the price-quantity pair that
corresponds to her true value.17 Thus, for any initial-period report l, the contract described in
Equations (13), (14), and (15) is “fully” incentive compatible: the buyer has no incentive to ever
misreport her shocks, even when multiple deviations are permitted.
Of course, this observation does not imply that the initial-period single-deviation constraint
(IC-0) is satisﬁed—recall that the envelope condition derived in Lemma 3.2 is only a necessary im-
plicationofperiod-zeroincentivecompatibility. However, AssumptionAimpliesthatthequantity
schedules are (weakly) increasing in l for all t and all possible reports at 2 At. The following the-
orem (with proof in the appendix) shows that this property is, in fact, sufﬁcient to guarantee that
the buyer reports truthfully in the initial period, and therefore the incentive compatibility of the
proposed contract.
THEOREM 2. Suppose that the distribution F satisﬁes Assumption A. Then the contract (q,p), where
q denotes the quantity schedules from Equation (13) and p denotes the payment rules from Equations (14)
and (15), is an optimal contract that solves the seller’s problem (P0).
In this setting, the regularity assumption on the distribution F implies that q
t is monotone in-
creasing in l; therefore, the seller’s menu is inﬁnite. However, as in the indivisible goods case dis-
cussed in Section 4.1, the optimal contract allows only a ﬁxed ﬁnite number of reported d shocks
before permanently excluding the buyer, and this upper bound depends only on the buyer’s re-
ported initial-period type l. Thus, each additional d shock reported by the buyer not only de-
creases the quantity she is allocated, but it also brings her closer to contract termination. Since
such shocks occur with strictly positive probability whenever l < 1, this outcome is essentially
unavoidable given a long enough time horizon T.
5. CONTINUOUS SHOCKS
In order to investigate the robustness of the results presented in the previous section, we now
present a more general formulation of the model. Instead of a setting with discrete shocks, we
17Note that this does not imply that the period-t menu is the optimal menu for (statically) screening across the buyer’s
potential period-t values in a setting where l is commonly known.
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examine a setting where the buyer’s valuation shocks in each period are drawn from a continu-




good from a single seller. The buyer’s utility in period t from consuming q units bought at a price
p is given by vtq   p. As before, the buyer’s marginal value for an additional unit vt is subject to a
series of multiplicative shocks, so that vt = atvt 1, where we take v0 = 1 to be exogenously given
and commonly known.
In each period t = 1,...,T, the buyer privately observes the shocks to her valuation, which
are the realizations fatg of a sequence of random variables f˜ atg, independently and identically
drawn from the conditional distribution G(jl) on the interval A := [a, ¯ a] with 0  a < ¯ a  ¥.
We denote by g(jl) the conditional density of G(jl), and assume that g(jl) is strictly positive
and differentiable on A for all l 2 L. Moreover, we assume that the family fG(jl)gl is ordered
in terms of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance; that is, G(jl) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates
G(jl0) whenever l > l0. In addition, we assume, for technical reasons, that all partial derivatives
of G exist and are bounded. Note that this, combined with the previous assumption, implies that
¶G(ajl)/¶l  0.
At the time of contracting (period zero), the buyer is privately informed about the parameter l
of the distribution that generates the sequence of shocks fatg. Speciﬁcally, the buyer privately ob-
serves the realization l of a random variable ˜ l, where it is commonly known that ˜ l is distributed
according to the distribution function F on an interval L := [l, ¯ l] with 0  l < ¯ l  ¥. We
assume that f, the density of F, is strictly positive and differentiable on L.
Weassumethatthesellercanproduce q unitsofthegoodineachperiodatacostof c(q) := q2/2.
The buyer-seller relationship is repeated for T  ¥ periods and payoffs are discounted with a
common discount factor d 2 (0,1] (where we impose the additional restriction that d¯ a < 1 if
T = ¥). The timing remains identical to that described in Section 2: in period zero, the seller
offers a long-term contract to the buyer; the buyer can either accept or reject this offer. If accepted,
the contract is executed in periods t = 1,...,T. The buyer’s outside option is normalized to 0. We
continue to assume that the monopolist enjoys full commitment to the contract she offers, but that
the buyer is free to break off the relationship at any time.
5.2. The Seller’s Problem
As in Section 3, the seller wishes to design and offer the contract that maximizes her expected
proﬁts. The Myerson (1986) revelation principle for multistage games continues to hold, and so
the search for optimal contracts is again greatly simpliﬁed (without loss of generality) by the con-
sideration of direct mechanisms where the buyer is incentivized to report truthfully conditional
on having reported truthfully in the past.
Thus, a contract in our setting is a sequence of payment rules p = fpt(rt,ht)gT
t=0 and allocation
probabilities q = fqt(rt,ht)gT
t=1, where rt is the buyer’s report at time t, and ht is the public history
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at time t. Note that in such a direct mechanism, r0 2 L, while rt 2 A for all t  1. In addition, ht
can be deﬁned recursively by h0 := Æ and ht := frt 1,ht 1g for all t  1, where rt 1 is the agents
report in period t   1. We denote the set of time t public histories by Ht. Since the agent is free
to misreport her private information at any time, her private history is ˆ ht := fat,rt 1, ˆ ht 1g, where
ˆ h0 := flg. We denote the set of time t private histories by ˆ Ht; the buyer’s strategy, given the
seller’s mechanism, is then simply a sequence of mappings ˆ rt : ˆ Ht ! A for t  1, and ˆ r0 : L ! L.
A mechanism is incentive compatible if, having reported truthfully in previous periods, the
agent has no incentive to misreport her new private information. As in Section 3, this implies
that the seller’s optimal mechanism must prevent the buyer from making multi-stage deviations
from truthtelling. So as to avoid considering this large class of potentially complex deviations,
we consider a relaxed version of the seller’s problem that considers only one-shot deviations from
truthfulness. We will then present asufﬁcient condition that guarantees theoptimal allocation rule
forthisrelaxedproblemispathindependent. Ourmainresultinthissectionshowsthatcombining
this allocation rule with a path-independent payment scheme yields an optimal mechanism that
guarantees the (full) incentive compatibility of the proposed mechanism.
With this in mind, let U0(l) denote the utility of a buyer with initial type l who always reports
her private information truthfully; thus, for all l 2 L, we have











where dWt(atjl) = Õ
t
t=1 dG(atjl). Similarly, let ˆ U0(l0,l) denote the expected utility of a buyer
with initial type l who reports some l0, but then truthfully reports all future shocks:











Thus, the initial-period single-deviation constraint requires that
U0(l)  ˆ U0(l0,l) for all l,l0 2 L. (IC-0)
Similarly, denote by Ut(at,at 1,l) the expected utility of a buyer who observes the period-t
shock at after truthfully reporting (at 1,l), and then continues to report truthfully. Then

















The period-t single-deviation constraint requires, for all truthful histories (at,l) 2 At  L, the
























In addition, a mechanism is individually rational if, in every period, continued truthtelling
guarantees the buyer’s continued willingness to participate in the contract. These individual ra-
tionality constraints may be summarized by the following:
U0(l)  0 for all l 2 L, and (IR-0)
Ut(at,l)  0 for all (at,l) 2 At  L and all t = 1,...,T. (IR-t)
The seller’s proﬁt from any feasible contract is the difference between total surplus and the
buyer’s utility. Thus, when the buyer is of initial type l, the seller’s expected proﬁt is











The seller’s optimal contract must then maximize proﬁts, subject to the constraints that the con-
sumerreceivesatleastherreservationutilityandthattheconsumerhavenoincentivetomisreport
her type. Therefore, any optimal long-term contract must solve the relaxed problem that imposes







subject to (IC-0), (IC-t), (IR-0), and (IR-t).
(Q)
5.3. Simplifying the Seller’s Relaxed Problem
We approach the optimal contracting problem by incorporating the period-t (where t  1)
single-deviation and participation constraints into the objective function. As the buyer’s utility is
quasilinear and satisﬁes the standard single-crossing conditions, the single-deviation constraints
are equivalent to (i) monotonicity of the buyer’s expected discounted allocation; and (ii) the deter-
mination of the buyer’s utility entirely by that expected allocation, up to a constant. In addition,
thesingle-crossing property pinsdownthis constantbythe individual rationalityconstraint. Since
the period-t buyer is forward-looking, her utility depends upon her expectations (in period t) over
future shocks in periods s  t. Naturally, this implies that the “localized” version of the period-t
constraints will involve the expected discounted allocations for s  t, which we denote by











The standard machinery yields the following result, whose proof may be found in the appendix:
LEMMA 5.1. The period-t single-deviation and individual rationality constraints (IC-t) and (IR-t) are sat-
isﬁed if, and only if, for all t = 1,...,T, and all (at 1,l) 2 At 1  L,
¶
¶at
Ut(at,at 1,l) = ¯ qt(at,at 1,l) for all at 2 A; (IC0-t)
¯ qt(at,at 1,l) is nondecreasing in at; and (MON-t)
Ut(a,at 1,l)  0. (IR0-t)
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Note that the buyer’s private information at the time of initial contracting does not directly af-
fect her payoffs. Rather, l only provides information about the path of future preferences over the
entire sequence of allocations. Therefore, the standard single-crossing condition does not apply,
and we must resort instead to an envelope argument in order to simplify the seller’s problem.
Using the following result (with proof in the appendix), we are able to remove the payment rules
from the objective function in the seller’s relaxed problem (Q). As in the case of discrete shocks
discussed in Section 3, this envelope condition is a necessary implication of period-zero incentive
compatibility, but it is not in general sufﬁcient.
LEMMA 5.2. Suppose that the single-deviation constraints (IC-0) and (IC-t) are satisﬁed for all t. Then the
derivative U0












Moreover, if the single-deviation constraints are satisﬁed, then the period-zero incentive rationality con-
straint (IR-0) is equivalent to the requirement that
U0(l)  0. (IR0-0)
Finally, we return to the seller’s problem. Since (IC0-0) must hold in any incentive compatible
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subject to (IC-0), (MON-t), (IR0-0), and (IR0-t).
Since U0(l) is an additive constant in the objective function above, it must be the case that the
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subject to (IC-0), (MON-t), and (IR0-t).
(Q0)
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5.4. The Optimal Contract
As in Section 3 (and as is standard in optimal mechanism design more generally), the seller here
is essentially maximizing virtual surplus, where the buyer’s virtual value in period t = 1,...,T is











The ﬁrst term in each of these expressions is the buyer’s contribution to the social surplus, while
the second term represents the information rents that must be left to the buyer in order to induce
truthful revelation of her private information. The inverse hazard rate (1  F(l))/f(l) appears
since any information rents paid to a buyer with initial type l must also be paid to buyers with
higher initial types. Meanwhile, the additional
¶G(ajl)/¶l
g(ajl)
terms are the “informativeness measures” of Baron and Besanko (1984), which reﬂect the infor-
mativeness of the initial-period private information l on future shocks as, where we sum over all
s  t to account for the different shocks through which l inﬂuences v(at).18 Note that ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance implies that ¶G(ajl)/¶l  0, and so these cumulative information rents are
not paid by the buyer, but rather to her; therefore, j(at,l)  v(at) for all (at,l) 2 At  L and all
t = 1,...,T.
Pointwise maximization (for each (at,l) tuple) of the integrand in (Q0) while ignoring (for now)







It is important to note that (unlike the buyer’s virtual value when values follow a recombinant
binomial tree), the virtual value j(at,l) need not be path independent: without additional re-
strictions on the conditional distribution G(jl), there may be at, ˆ at 2 At such that v(at) = v(ˆ at)
but the summation in Equation (22) yields j(at,l) 6= j(ˆ at,l).19 Meanwhile, our approach to solv-
ing for the optimal long-term contract (considering the single-deviation relaxation of the seller’s
problem) relies on pairing a path-independent allocation rule with a path-independent pricing
rule to guarantee incentive compatibility with respect to compound deviations.
To enable this approach, we impose an additional separability assumption on the conditional
distribution of shocks in order to guarantee path-independence of the allocation rule:
ASSUMPTION B.1. There exist some constants a,b 2 R and a function g : L ! R such that
¶G(ajl)/¶l
g(ajl)
= a(a + blog(a))g(l)
for all a 2 A and all l 2 L.
18Since values are multiplicative in the shocks, the additional distortions generated by the dependence of v(at) on l
have the additive structure above. This is in contrast to, for example, the nature of distortions in Besanko (1985), the
autoregressive values examples of Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009, 2010), and the model of Krähmer and Strausz (2011).
19It is still true, however, that shocks commute: j(at,l) = j(s(at),l) for all at 2 At and all possible permutations s.
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Notice that, under this assumption, we may write the buyer’s virtual value as



















where the second equality follows from the fact that v(at
 s,as 1)as = v(at). Thus, Assumption B.1
implies that the period-t virtual value (and hence the allocation rule above) depends only on t, on
l, and on the buyer’s value in that period, but not on the speciﬁc sequence of shocks generating
that value. This does not imply, however, that the allocation rule is independent of t, as for any
distinct t and t0, v(at) = v(at0
) implies that j(at,l) 6= j(at0
,l) (as long as a 6= 0).
Clearly, Assumption B.1 involves some loss of generality. However, there are many natural
and commonly used parametric classes of distributions for which the condition is satisﬁed. For





if G is an exponential distribution with mean l, a Pareto distribution with minimum value l
and arbitrary shape parameter, or a truncated normal distribution with mean 0 and variance l2,
then
¶G(ajl)/¶l
g(ajl) =   a
l. When the shocks are distributed according to a lognormal distribution
with mean l (and arbitrary non-zero variance), then the ratio in question equals  a. Thus, while
Assumption B.1 is not without loss of generality, it certainly does not rule out all cases of interest.
Therefore, under Assumption B.1, it is possible to write the optimal allocation rule as a function
ˆ q
t of the buyer’s reported value v(at) instead of the speciﬁc sequence of shocks at:
ˆ q
t(v(at),l) := q
t(at,l) = maxfj(at,l),0g. (23)
We then pair this path-independent allocation rule with a path-independent payment rule that
simply screens across each period’s values as in a standard Mussa and Rosen (1978) nonlinear
pricing problem. To this end, we deﬁne
p





where at is the buyer’s lowest possible value in period-t. Thus, in each period t, the seller offers
what is essentially a static screening mechanism (q
t(,l), p
t(,l)) that depends only on the initial
report of l. Note that Assumption B.1 implies that incentives for truthful reporting in the period-t
mechanism are completely uncoupled from the incentives in any other period—the initial period
report of l determines speciﬁc menu offered in period t, but does not affect the buyer’s incentives
within that menu. Therefore, the single-deviation constraints (IC-t) are sufﬁcient for “full” incen-
tive compatibility. Standard results then yield the following necessary and sufﬁcient condition for
the proposed allocation rule in Equation (23) to satisfy these single-deviation constraints:
ASSUMPTION B.2. For all t = 1,...,T, the allocation rule q
t that solves the seller’s relaxed problem (Q0)
is (weakly) increasing in v(at).
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Moreover, note that—since j(at,l)  v(at) for all (at,l) 2 At  L—the buyer’s ﬂow utility
in each period (when reporting truthfully) is non-negative. This immediately implies that the
period-t participation constraints (IR-t) are satisﬁed for all t  1.
The ﬁnal remaining piece of the optimal contract is the period-zero payment. However, since
we have p
t for all t  1, this payment is easily determined using the integral representation of


































It remains to be seen that this contract is, in fact, incentive compatible, as the envelope condi-
tion derived in Lemma 5.2 is, in general, only a necessary condition for the initial-period single-
deviation constraint (IC-0). As in Section 4, the additional assumption that the quantity schedules
are increasing in l does yield initial-period incentive compatibility.
ASSUMPTION B.3. For all t = 1,...,T, the allocation rule that solves the seller’s relaxed problem (Q0)—
q
t in Equation (23)—is (weakly) increasing in l.
This assumption is the counterpart to Assumption A, and the following theorem (which we
prove in the appendix) is the counterpart in this more general setting to Theorems 1 and 2.
THEOREM 3. Suppose that Assumptions B.1, B.2, and B.3 are satisﬁed. Then the contract (q,p), where
q denotes the quantity schedules from Equation (23) and p denotes the payment rules from Equations (24)
and (25), is an optimal contract that solves the seller’s problem (Q0).
Having established this result, let us explore an important property of the optimal contract.
Deﬁne k1(l) to be the lowest value of a1 that the buyer can report that, given her initial-period









The cutoff k1(l) is decreasing (weakly) since, by Assumption B.3, q
1 is increasing (weakly) in l.
Similarly, deﬁne kt(at 1,l) to be the lowest value of at that the buyer can report in period t that,









for all t = 2,...,T, where we let kt(at 1,l) := ¯ a if the set above is empty. Again, because As-
sumptions B.2 and B.3 imply that q
t is (weakly) increasing in l and as for all s  t, kt is (weakly)
decreasing in each of its arguments.
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As (¶G(¯ a,l)/¶l)/g(¯ ajl) = 0 for all l 2 L, it must be the case that q
1(¯ a,l) = ¯ a > 0 and thus
k1(l) < ¯ a for all l. Similarly, this implies that qt(¯ a,..., ¯ a,l) = ¯ at > 0, and so (by continuity)
kt(¯ a,..., ¯ a,l) < ¯ a for all l. Hence, for every possible initial-period report of l, the set of reports
leading to positive quantities in any period t  1 is of non-zero measure. However, unlike k1(l),
it is entirely possible that kt(at 1,l) = ¯ a, implying that the buyer is not allocated any amount of
the good, regardless of her period-t report.
One such instance is when at < kt(at 1,l) (or equivalently, whenever q
t(at,l) = 0). If this is
the case, we must have











But note that the buyer’s period-(t + 1) virtual value, given at and l, is




































where the inequality is guaranteed by the fact that ¶G(ajl)/¶l  0 for all a and l via ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance. Therefore, kt+1(at,l) = ¯ a whenever at  kt(at 1,l). Thus, if the buyer
is excluded in some period t, she continues to be excluded in all future periods, regardless of her
reported shocks—once a buyer has been “cut off,” she is cut off permanently.
In addition, note that the optimal contract involves a form of “tightening the screws,” as the set
of reports that lead to a positive quantity in any period t+1  T is contained in the corresponding
set for period t. To see this, let a := kt(at 1,l), and suppose that a > a, so that there are some
period-t reports that lead to the buyer’s exclusion. If the buyer’s period-t shock is a (so she is
“just barely” excluded), while her period-(t + 1) shock is any a > a, then


























kt+1(kt(at 1,l),at 1,l) = ¯ a.
Thus, a buyer who is on the cusp of allocation in period t is excluded in period t+1, regardless of
her realized shock.
Meanwhile, note that for any at 2 At and l 2 L, the virtual value of a buyer who experiences
the highest possible shock ¯ a is simply the product of this shock with her virtual value from the
previous period; that is,






This expression is positive if, and only if, at  kt(at 1,l); thus,
kt+1(¯ a,at 1,l) = kt(at 1,l).
Thus, if a buyer receives a positive quantity of the good in period t and then observes the highest
possible shock ¯ a in period t+1, she will again be allocated a positive quantity period t+1. In fact,
a straightforward continuity argument implies that a buyer allocated a positive quantity in period
t will be allocated a positive quantity in period t + 1 as long as her shock is sufﬁciently close to ¯ a.
Finally, recall that kt+1(at,l) is decreasing in at. This property, combined with the two obser-
vations above, implies that, for any at  kt(at 1,l), the set of “admissible” period-(t + 1) reports
[kt+1(at,l), ¯ a] that lead to a positive allocation in period t + 1 is a subset of the corresponding set
of “admissible” period-t reports [kt(at 1,l), ¯ a].
This feature of the optimal contract is the continuous analog of the ﬁnite honeymoon phases
in the discrete shock single-unit demand setting of Section 4.1. Recall that the optimal contract
in that setting allowed, for each initial-period report l, a ﬁxed number of “low” d reports before
excluding the buyer from future allocations, implying that the probability of contract termination
by the seller was increasing over time. In the continuous-convex setting considered here, this
effect is captured by the fact that the set of reports that lead to an allocation (or, equivalently, that
prevent permanent exclusion) is shrinking over time. Thus, as in Section 4, the seller progressively
screens the buyer by restricting supply and increasing the probability of permanent exclusion as
the relationship progresses.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is not only pri-
vately informed about her value at every point in time, but also about the process by which her
value evolves. We then solve for the seller’s optimal contract, taking into account the buyer’s in-
centives for participation and for truthful revelation throughout the interaction. As in earlier work
in dynamic mechanism design and sequential screening, we demonstrate that option contracts—
contracts where the seller offers the buyer her choice from a menu of “buy” options—are proﬁt-
maximizing mechanisms. However, by extending the literature to more general time horizons, we
are able to study the dynamic features of these contracts. Thus, the optimal long-term contract in
our more general setting features surprisingly simple menus of options that vary not only by up-
front cost and future strike price, but also by the generosity of quantity provision over the course
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of the contract. In particular, these more generous choices require greater upfront investments by
the buyer while featuring lower strike prices. Moreover, we identify an additional mechanism by
which the seller price discriminates across buyers with differing willingness to pay: over time,
sales are made to fewer and fewer buyers, as the seller progressively screens and excludes lower-
valued buyers and ratchets prices upwards, thereby reducing the rents paid to higher-valued buy-
ers. In the long-run, this leads to inefﬁciently early termination of the buyer-seller relationship, a
feature that is not readily intuited using the two-period models prevalent in the literature.
Our model and results set the stage for several avenues of further inquiry. For example, there
are a number of settings where the contracting environment or the value of the relationship are
inﬂuenced by investments made by the agent. Exploring the dynamics of contracting in such
an environment would advance our understanding of incentive provision beyond the present
work’s focus on adverse selection. Another set of interesting questions arise when considering
the seller’s power to commit: since the optimal contract in our setting is not renegotiation-proof,
our assumption of full commitment power has substantial bite. Understanding the precise role of
commitment would therefore be a natural topic for additional investigation. Finally, competition
among both buyers and sellers in a dynamic environment such as our own is not particularly well-
understood; progress in this direction would greatly advance our knowledge and yield important
insights for market analysis and design. We leave these questions, however, for future research.
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APPENDIX OF OMITTED PROOFS




































from the right-hand side of the inequality yields
Ut(at,at 1,l)  Ut(a0
t,at 1,l) + (at   a0
t)qt(a0
t,at 1,l)v(at 1)















Therefore, for all at,a0
t 2 A, at 1 2 At 1 and l 2 L, we have
Ut(at,at 1,l)  Ut(a0
t,at 1,l) + (at   a0
t)¯ qt(a0
t,at 1,l).
Letting at = u and a0
t = d, we can write the inequality above as
Ut(u,at 1,l)  Ut(d,at 1,l) + ¯ qt(d,at 1,l)D for all at 1 2 At 1 and l 2 L,
where D := u   d. In addition, letting at = d and a0
t = u, the inequality above implies that
Ut(d,at 1,l)  Ut(u,at 1,l)   ¯ qt(u,at 1,l)D for all at 1 2 At 1 and l 2 L.
Notice that rearranging the ﬁrst of these two inequalities immediately yields condition (IC0-t).
Similarly, adding the two inequalities yields condition (MON-t).
Finally, with conditions (IC0-t) and (MON-t) in hand, (IR-t) is satisﬁed only if
Ut(d,at 1,l)  0 for all at 1 2 At 1 and l 2 L;
that is, only if (IR0-t) holds.
Note that the sufﬁciency of the conditions derived above for the period-t single-deviation and
individual rationality constraints follows immediately via basic arithmetic. 

















































































where we have made use of the deﬁnition of Us+1(as,l0). With this in hand, recall the deﬁnition
of ˆ U0(l0,l) from Equation (2):










We can rewrite this expression as











































































Proceeding inductively, we may conclude that







































































Since condition (IC-0) requires that ˆ U0(l,l) = maxl0f ˆ U0(l0,l)g for all l, the envelope theorem






























































































t(at,) is non-decreasing for all t and at (due to Assumption A), so is ¯ q
t(d,at 1,). There-
fore,













































































where the equality follows from the identity in Equation (6).






































if mt < t.
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m=l ut mdm if mt < t.
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t   mt + 1












mt   1  k





Using the binomial identity (
n 1



























j + mt   k   1





















































Therefore, for all l,l0 2 L, ˆ U0(l,l)  ˆ U0(l0,l); that is, for each l 2 L, ˆ U0(l0,l) achieves a
global maximum when l0 = l, implying that the buyer has no incentive to misreport her private
information in the initial-period. Combined with the observation that the mechanism (q,p) is
incentive compatible in all t  1, this implies that this mechanism does, in fact, maximize the
seller’s proﬁts. 
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where the equality comes from the identity in Equation (6). Since for all t and all m 2 L, q
t(at,m)
onlydependson at through m(at) = å
t
s=1 1d(as), wewillabusenotationslightlyandwrite q
t(k,m)
to denote the quantity allocated in period t to a buyer who has reported (at,m) with m(at) = k.













































































































Fix an arbitrary t  1, and note that (ignoring the dt coefﬁcient) the summand in the second line















where we have used the fact that the innermost (rightmost) summation equals zero when k = t.




























(t   k)(l0)t k 1(1  l0)k   k(l0)t k(1  l0)k 1

.






















































































(t   j   1)!(j + 1)!
= 0.


































¶l0 Dut jdj 1 is a decreasing function of k and kt is a random variable
drawn from a binomial distribution with parameters t and m 2 fl,l0g. Therefore, the stochastic






> 0 if l0 < l,
= 0 if l0 = l,
< 0 if l0 > l.
Thus, holding l ﬁxed, ˆ U0(l0,l) is maximized when l0 = l—the buyer has no incentive to misre-
portherinitial-periodprivateinformation. Asestablishedinthemaintext, themechanism(q,p)
is incentive compatible in all periods t  1, and so this mechanism is, indeed, optimal. 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 5.1. Fix any t = 1,...,T, and notice that the period-t single-deviation con-



























Thus, Ut(at,) is an afﬁne maximizer, and therefore a convex function of at. Moreover, standard
techniques imply that we can rewrite the expressions above as
Ut(at,at 1,l)  Ut(a0
t,at 1,l) + ¯ qt(at,at 1,l)(at   a0
t).
Thus, ¯ qt(at,) is a subderivative of Ut(at,). But since the Ut(at,) is convex, it is absolutely con-
tinuous and, hence, differentiable almost everywhere. Moreover, whenever the partial derivative
exists, it must equal its subderivative. Finally, convexity implies that this partial derivative must
be a nondecreasing function of at. Thus, the period-t single-deviation constraint (IC-t) implies
conditions (MON-t) and (IC0-t).
In addition, recall that every absolutely continuous function is equal to the deﬁnite integral of
its derivative. Therefore, for all at 2 At and l 2 L,






But since the quantity schedule qt() is non-negative, the integrand above is also non-negative;
therefore, condition (IR-t) is satisﬁed only if Ut(a,at 1,l)  0.
Note that the sufﬁciency of the localized conditions derived above for the period-t single-
deviation and participation constraints essentially follows from the Fundamental Theorem of Cal-
culus and monotonicity of the (expected) allocation ¯ qt. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.2. Recall from Equation (17) that ˆ U0(l0,l) is deﬁned as































































































Therefore, we may write


















Substituting in from the expressions above yields






















Proceeding inductively in this manner (and making use of the fact that dG(ajm) = g(ajm)da for
all m 2 L), we may conclude that










At Ut(at,l0)(g(atjl)   g(atjl0))dWt 1(at 1jl)dat.
Furthermore, recall that the constraint (IC-0) requires that U0(l) = maxl0f ˆ U0(l0,l)g for all














































where the ﬁnal equality follows from integration by parts. Note, however, that G(ajl) = 0 for
all l, and G(¯ ajl) = 1 for all l; therefore, ¶G(a,l)/¶l = ¶G(¯ a,l)/¶l = 0. Substituting in the






















Finally, note that qt() is non-negative for all t, implying that ¯ qt is also non-negative for all t.
In addition, ¶G(ajl)/¶l  0 for all a 2 A by ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Therefore, U0
0(l)
is positive and U0 is an increasing function. This implies that we can replace the period-zero
participation constraint (IR-0) with the requirement that U0(l)  0. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. Making use of the deﬁnition of p from Equations (24) and (25), we may







































































































































































































Note, however, that Assumption B.3 implies that, for all t = 1,...,T, ¶ˆ q
t(v0,l0)/¶l  0 for all







is an increasing functions of as for all s = 1,...,t. The fact that fG(jl)gl2L is ordered by ﬁrst-






> 0 if l0 < l,
= 0 if l0 = l,
< 0 if l0 > l.
Thus, holding l ﬁxed, ˆ U0(l0,l) achieves a global maximum when l0 = l, implying that period-
zero single-deviation constraint (IC-0) is satisﬁed.
Finally, note that (as discussed earlier) Assumptions B.1 and B.2 imply that the buyer is always
incentivized to report her private information truthfully in any period t  1, regardless of her
reports (or misreports) in previous periods. Therefore, the contract (q,p) not only solves the
seller’srelaxedproblem(Q0), butisfullyincentivecompatible: thebuyerpreferstruthfulreporting
to any potential deviation, regardless how complex. 
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